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Abstract—When adversaries are powerful enough to coerce
users to reveal encryption keys, encryption alone becomes insuf-
ficient for data protection. Plausible deniability (PD) mechanisms
resolve this by enabling users to hide the mere existence of
sensitive data, often by providing plausible “cover texts” or
“public data volumes” hosted on the same device.
Unfortunately, with the increasing prevalence of (NAND)
flash as a high-performance cost-effective storage medium, PD
becomes even more challenging in the presence of realistic
adversaries who can usually access a device at multiple points
in time (“multi-snapshot”). This is because read/write operations
to flash do not result in intuitive corresponding changes to the
underlying device state.
The problem is further compounded by the fact that this
behavior is mostly proprietary. For example, in a majority of
commercially-available flash devices, an issued delete or overwrite
operation from the upper layers almost certainly won’t result in
an actual immediate erase of the underlying flash cells.
To address these challenges, we designed a new class of write-
once memory (WOM) codes to store hidden bits in the same
physical locations as other public bits. This is made possible by
the inherent nature of NAND flash and the possibility of issuing
multiple writes to target cells that have not previous been written
to in existing pages.
We designed PEARL, a general-purpose Flash Translation
Layer (FTL) that allows users to plausibly deniably store hidden
data in NAND flash devices. We implemented and evaluated
PEARL on a widely used simulator FlashSim[32]. PEARL
performs well on real-world workloads, comparably to non-PD
baselines. PEARL is the first system that achieves strong plausible
deniability for NAND flash devices, secure against realistic multi-
snapshot adversaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
As computers permeate aspects of daily life, individual
users, government officials, and organizations store increasing
amounts of sensitive and private data on personal computers
and mobile devices. While convenient, the ubiquitousness
of computing devices that move data with individuals poses
increasing threats to privacy. There have been a number of
high-profile cases where a laptop or device with sensitive data
is lost or stolen, leading to disclosure of sensitive information
[15], [33], [38], [39], [49]. Thus, protecting sensitive data is
essential, as one can never anticipate when a device may fall
into the wrong hands.
To ensure sensitive data confidentiality, full disk encryption
(FDE) is widely used. However, considering adversaries who
are empowered by law or otherwise to request encryption keys
[3], [31], [48], [42], [43], the FDE alone may not be enough
as it would be defeated by coercion of users into submitting
the key or password to reveal confidential data.
Plausible deniability (PD) is a key security property that
helps to protect sensitive data against the mentioned powerful
adversaries. PD by definition makes it possible to claim that
“some information is not in possession [of the user] or some
transactions have not taken place” [36]. In the context of
secure storage, PD refers to the ability of a user to plausibly
deny the existence of stored data even when an adversary has
access to the storage medium. It supplements the capability of
encryption to protect sensitive data from powerful adversaries.
PD assurances are sometimes a matter of life and death [41].
This has been demonstrated by numerous cases where in-
formation had to be transferred through checkpoints manned
by hostile adversaries. One typical and prominent example
involves the human rights group Network for Human Rights
Documentation - Burma (ND-Burma). A large amount of data
on human rights violations by the Burmese government was
carried out of the country on mobile devices by ND-Burma
activists, under threat of exposure at checkpoints and border
crossings [6]. Similarly, in 2012, a videographer smuggled
evidence of human rights violations out of Syria by hiding
a micro-SD card in a wound [37], again risking his life.
Several PD storage mechanisms were proposed [36], [3],
[40], [5], [7], [8], [9] for both file system and block device
layers. However, a strong assumption underpins all these
existing solutions, mostly deriving from traditional magnetic
media, namely a high level of transactional commitment from
the underlying storage medium. Specifically, write and erase
operations are assumed to be honored when issued.
Needless to say, storage media such as NAND flash is
wrapped in logic that prevents this to be the case. For example,
most Flash Translation Layer (FTL) algorithms will likely
prevent overwrites to touch underlying physical pages when
issued and instead remap data elsewhere, only to later return
and garbage collect such erased data if and when needed. This
immediately breaks existing PD mechanisms built upon the
assumption that the underlying device honors write/erase op-
erations when requested. Stale data persisted on the underlying
device (e.g., yet to be garbage collected pages) out of control
of the PD logic then enables adversaries to easily infer the
existence and most often location of hidden data [24].
New media requires new PD logic. Further, arguably, this
logic needs to be placed closer to the physical layer to securely
handle the PD requirements while also providing life-cycle and
efficiency-related elements such as wear leveling and encoding
optimizations.
NAND flash, arguably the most popular flash technology in
modern production, stores data in an array of cells, each requir-
ing a special ERASE operation before a write. Due to several
addressing and packaging optimization reasons, almost always
ERASE can only be performed at block level (containing many
cells). As a result, even simple updates to data require a more
complex set of steps which is implemented usually in an
intermediary Flash Translation Layer (FTL) sitting between
e.g., a file system and the underlying flash device. The FTL
makes an excellent candidate [24] for implementing protection
functionality including PD logic.
Two existing have considered PD tailored for NAND flash:
DEFY [41], and DEFTL [24]. Unfortunately, neither is secure
against practical adversaries which are almost always multi-
snapshot [9]. Crossing a border twice, checking in airline
luggage, living under an oppressive government with physical
access to devices, leaving devices in untrusted places subject to
“hotel maid” attacks, all these are instances of multi-snapshot
opportunities for an adversary. Naturally, the security of a PD
system should not break down completely (under reasonable
user behavior) and should be resilient to such realistic external-
ities (hotel maids, border guards, airline checked luggage etc).
Further, DEFY is compromised in the presence of capacity
exhausting attacks [24].
PEARL introduces the first PD scheme that achieves security
against multi-snapshot adversaries on NAND flash devices.
This is made possible by re-purposing a new class of write-
once memory (WOM) codes to naturally combine both public
and hidden data together in one physical page, and managing
the pages considering the nature of flash memory. PEARL
is implemented as a general purpose FTL that, in addition
to taking all necessary flash management duties, enables
deniability of the existence of hidden data. It guarantees that
the resulting state of a device with both public and hidden data
is indistinguishable from a public-data only state. A number
of key insights ground the design as follows.
First, PEARL operates at a much finer encoding granularity
compared with previous PD schemes. Existing work [24], [41]
store public and hidden data in different physical pages or
even different flash blocks. These systems require plausible
reasons to explain away the existence of written pages con-
taining hidden data (e.g. masquerading as “random” or “free”
data). This problem is compounded by the nature of NAND
flash and the realistic adversaries with multi-snapshot access.
Hidden data may end up being relocated even in the absence
of hidden updates, and adversaries can observe implausible
modifications (e.g., to “free” space containing hidden data). In
contrast, PEARL uses the second write stage of a specially-
designed WOM code to encode hidden data in a public cover.
This makes such plausible reasons inherent – all pages contain
public data by design.
Second, PEARL as an FTL smartly manages the mapping
from both public and hidden data to physical pages and
handles NAND-specific operations such as garbage collections
considering the special nature of flash memory. As a result, all
physical layer changes can be plausibly explained by public
data requests only, thus preventing multi-snapshot adversaries
from detecting the existence of hidden data by comparing
snapshots and analyzing physical activities on flash.
We evaluated PEARL using a widely used simulator Flash-
Sim [32]. The experimental results show PEARL is practically
fast. It performs comparably to the non-PD baseline on real-
world workloads.
II. RELATED WORK
PD storage systems are designed to protect users against
powerful adversaries (e.g., corrupt government officials) who
can coerce users to give up the encryption key(s). Generally
speaking, a PD storage system allows the user to only reveal
the key used to encrypt (non-sensitive) public data while
claiming that no other data exists on the device.
Steganographic file systems [3], [36], [40], [41] were firstly
proposed to provide plausibly-deniable storage. They allowed
users to store both sensitive (hidden) files and non-sensitive
(public) files inside one file system and hide the existence
of hidden files from adversaries. To defend against single-
snapshot adversaries, Anderson et al. [3] explored the idea
of steganographic file systems and proposed two ideas for
hiding data. Later McDonald et al. [36] implemented StegFS
for Linux on the basis of the solution proposed in [3]. Pang et
al. [40] improved on the previous constructions by avoiding
hash collisions and provided more efficient storage. In addition
to these steganographic file systems against single-snapshot
adversaries, Han et al. [17] designed a multi-user stegano-
graphic file system (DRSteg) on shared storage. However,
their solution does not scale well to practical scenarios as
they attribute deniability to joint ownership of sensitive data.
Gasti et al. [12] proposed a deniable shared file system
(DenFS) specifically for cloud storage. Its security depends
on processing data temporarily on a client machine, and it is
not straightforward to deploy DenFS for local storage.
On the other hand, disk encryption tools [1], [20], [45],
[5], [7], [8], [9] were designed to support PD at block
device level. They worked by often storing both hidden
and public “volumes” on the same device while preventing
adversaries to gain information about how many volumes
the device actually contains. Truecrypt [1], Rubberhose [20]
and Mobiflage [45] provided deniability against only single-
snapshot adversaries. Blass et al. [5] implemented HIVE,
the first PD solution against multi-snapshot adversaries at
device level, using a write-only Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
for mapping data from logical volumes to underlying devices
and hiding access patterns for hidden data within requests to
public data. Later Chakraborti et al. [7] proposed DataLair
with a more efficient write-only ORAM and improved the
system performance. Chang et al. [8] proposed MobiCeal
specifically for mobile devices. The idea is to use a dummy
write mechanism to obfuscate writes to a hidden volume.
Unfortunately the paper suffers from deniability compromises:
the space occupied by dummy writes would be reclaimed
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while the space occupied by the hidden data would remain
intact, thus enabling an attacker to detect the static hidden data.
Chen et al. [9] introduced PD-DM, a locality-preserving PD
solution that eliminated the randomness introduced by ORAM-
based solutions and improved the system throughput especially
on hard disk.
The above solutions required that the underlying devices
honor write/erase operations atomically. Unfortunately in the
case of flash this is simply not the case. Old data can linger
on the device for years and attackers can easily unscrew the
flash cover and read the FLASH chips directly with cheap
off the shelf readers. Others have noted this too [24] – PD
systems incorporating deniability in the upper layers (file
system layer or block device layer) very often suffer from
deniability compromises in the lower layers (flash memory).
And unfortunately even systems such as Mobiflage and Mo-
biCeal specifically designed for mobile devices do not address
this essential vulnerability.
Special PD solutions are designed for NAND flash storage
devices as well, considering its significant distinctive natures.
DEFY [41] is a log structured file system for NAND flash
devices that offers PD with a newly proposed secure dele-
tion technology. It is based on WhisperYAFFS [47], a log
structured file system which provides full disk encryption
for flash devices. However, as claimed in [24], DEFY will
be compromised by making several attempts to exhaust the
writing capacity. DEFTL [24] instead incorporates deniability
to the Flash Translation Layer (FTL) of flash-based block
devices. Yet, it is against single-snapshot adversaries.
III. NAND FLASH
NAND flash is a non-volatile solid-state storage medium.
It is becoming increasingly popular due to its low power
consumption and shock resistance now. Unlike the traditional
magnetic storage disk that stores data by magnetizing the fer-
romagnetic material on a disk, NAND flash stores data using
only electronic circuits (floating-gates). Thus, NAND flash has
its own characteristics [14]: 1) NAND flash supports efficient
random accesses. 2) Read and write/program operations are
performed in page units while erase operations are based on
block units (usually larger than the page size by 64 or more
times). 3) In addition to a data area, a page in NAND flash
also contains a small spare OOB area which may be used for
storing a variety of information such as the Error Correction
Code (ECC) bytes, the logical page number and the page state.
4) An erase operation is required before writing in NAND
flash. A floating-gate is charged during writing while only an
erase can remove the charge from the gate. 5) NAND flash
can withstand only a finite number of program-erase cycles
(P/E cycles).
A. Flash Translation Layer (FTL)
To use NAND flash devices, we need either a file system
specifically for raw NAND flash or a Flash Translation Layer
(FTL) between the file system and the raw flash device. Some
of the example NAND flash file systems that have been added
to Linux kernel are UBIFS [2] and F2FS [34]. On the other
hand, the FTL is an intermediate software layer between the
host application (e.g. file systems) and NAND flash. It accepts
logical requests from host and maps the logical addresses
(LBAs) to physical addresses of the NAND flash.
In addition to the logical-to-physical address mapping,
a FTL is also responsible for some other necessary flash
management duties such as wear leveling, garbage collection
and so on. Wear leveling aims to smoothly distribute erases
among blocks in the flash so that the blocks all reach their P/E
cycle limit at the same time. Garbage collection is designed
to efficiently reclaim pages that are no longer needed (i.e.
invalid) in the device. Remembering that these pages cannot
be simply erased at your leisure as they may be in blocks that
still contain active data (i.e. valid). Instead, the FTL do the
page recycle following these three steps: 1) adaptively select
a victim block to be erased; 2) transparently move active data
elsewhere; 3) erase the victim block.
According to how the logical-to-physical address mapping
is performed, FTL schemes can be categorized into three
groups: page-level FTLs, block-level FTLs and hybrid FTLs.
The page-level FTL maps any logical page from the host to
a physical page in the flash while the block-level FTL maps
a whole logical block (containing multiple logical pages) to a
physical block in flash. The hybrid FTL combines the page-
level and block-level FTL by logically partitioning flash blocks
into data blocks and log blocks. Data blocks are mapped with
the block-level mapping while the log blocks are mapped using
the page-level mapping scheme. Updates are written to log
blocks, after which merge operations may happen to combine
the active pages in data blocks and log blocks together as
new data blocks. PEARL deploys a page-level FTL based on
DFTL[16].
B. Demand-based FTL (DFTL)
DFTL is an efficient page-level FTL that avoids the inef-
ficiency of hybrid FTLs and reduces the SRAM requirement
for the page-level mapping. The page-level mapping table is
stored in the flash memory and only a small amount of active
mapping entries are cached in SRAM. A data structure called
Global Translation Directory (GTD) is used to keep track of
the whole mapping table scattered over the flash device. Figure
1 shows the organization of DFTL.
Logical-to-physical address translation. The address trans-
lation in DFTL is related to three data structures: the page-
level mapping table, the Global Translation Directory (GTD)
and the Cached Mapping Table (CMT). As shown in Figure 1,
the page-level mapping table is packed into pages (named as
translation pages) in the order of Logical data Page Numbers
(LPNs) and stored in translation blocks in the flash. The
CMT stores the mapping entries (LPN-to-PPN) for those most
recently accessed data pages and updates them using the seg-
mented LRU array cache algorithm [28]. The GTD maintains
the physical page address information for all the translation
pages. One translation page could store 512 mapping entries,
if an address is represented in 4 bytes and the page size is
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Fig. 1. The organization of DFTL. LPN is the Logical data Page
Number, PPN is the Physical Page Number, MV PN is the Virtual
Translation Page Number, MPPN is the Physical Translation Page
Number.
2KB. In this case, the first translation page with MV PN = 0
stores the mapping information for the first 512 logical pages
and so forth, and the location of this translation page will be
the first entry in the GTD. Both the CMT and the GTD are
stored in the SRAM.
Once a logical request comes, the DFTL will first query the
CMT for the mapping information. The request will be directly
fulfilled if the mapping is found. Other wise, the DFTL fetches
the mapping information from the flash into the CMT by the
follow steps: 1) it checks the GTD for the physical location of
the corresponding translation page; 2) it reads the translation
page for the mapping and adds it into the CMT. A CMT
eviction may happen during the above procedure. The evicted
item needs to be written back only if it has been changed after
loaded. This consists of 3 steps: 1) locate the corresponding
translation page by consulting the GTD; 2) read the translation
page and write it back to a new physical location with updated
information. 3) update the corresponding GTD entry. After the
coming logical request is performed, the mapping information
may be updated if necessary. Note that it will be always
updated in CMT. The update to the translation pages on flash
will only happen if a CMT eviction happens.
Page allocation and garbage collection. In DFTL, data
pages are written into data blocks whereas translation pages
are written into translation blocks. DFTL maintains two blocks
called Current Data Block and Current Translation Block for
the page allocation. A free block will be chosen as the new
Current Data Block or new Current Translation Block from
a free block list when pages in either of the two blocks are
used up. The garbage collector will choose the block with the
least number of active pages as the victim to recycle. If the
victim block is a translation block, DFTL copies the active
translation pages to the Current Translation Block and update
the GTD before erasing the victim block. Otherwise, if the
victim is a data block, DFTL relocates the active data pages to
the Current Data Block and update the corresponding mapping
information in the CMT.
IV. MODEL
In a typical scenario, a user requires secure data storage
for sensitive hidden data (which needs to be protected from
powerful adversaries), and less sensitive public data (which do
not require any special protection mechanisms). The adversary
is coercive and can compel the user to hand over encryption
keys etc. Under duress, the user may need to reveal keys to
public data while denying the existence of the hidden data.
An effective PD system should therefore not only hide the
contents of the hidden data but also its very existence.
Deployment. PEARL incorporates the PD functionality in
the NAND flash FTL. Specifically, PEARL stores multiple
logical block volumes on one physical flash device – some
of the volumes store hidden data while others store public
data. W.l.o.g., for simplicity, we discuss here a design with
only two volumes. The data in the public and hidden volumes
are encrypted with different encryption keys, Kpub and Khid
respectively. The keys may be securely derived from user-
generated passwords or other more secure mechanisms.
PEARL can be used either in a public-only mode – in
which case the user can only access public data – or in a
public+hidden mode where the user can access both hidden
and public data. To determine the mode of operation, the user
provides appropriate passwords/keys at boot time (or when the
device is plugged in after a reboot etc). For the public-only
mode, the user providesKpub; to access also hidden data both
khid and Kpub are required. Note that under coercion, the user
will reveal Kpub to the adversary and operate in the public-
only mode. As we will see, PEARL ensures that an adversary
observing flash state does not gain a non-negligible advantage
in detecting the existence of Khid or of any hidden data.
When hidden data is stored on the device, PEARL should
be operated in the public+hidden mode since the system
running in public-only mode (without the hidden key) may
overwrite hidden data (e.g., during garbage collection). As
discussed later, hidden data is relocated before an ERASE
during garbage collection. Without the hidden key, PEARL
cannot re-encrypt and relocate this data to new locations. This
is a common assumption for NAND flash PD solutions[41].
Adversary. When defining a threat model, it is important to
also consider any hardware-related characteristics that may re-
sult in adversarial advantages. The PD adversaries we consider
come with the following assumptions:
• Although adversaries can coerce users into giving up
encryption keys, they are computationally bounded and
“rational” – they stop coercing users if no evidence of
hidden data is observed.
• Adversaries are aware of the underlying design of a
PD system. In other words, the goal is not to provide
security through obscurity. But at the same time, the mere
presence of a PD system in the software stack will not
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Fig. 2. The organization of a NAND flash storage device with an FTL
supporting PD.
serve as evidence that the user is hiding information. Ide-
ally, once plausible deniability systems become efficient
enough, they will be simply deployed in the standard OS
codebase. Therefore, a flash device with PEARL will not
be a red flag to the adversary.
• Adversaries have ”multi-snapshot” capabilities and can
access the raw image1 of a user’s NAND flash device ar-
bitrary number of times. Note that existing work on flash-
based PD systems considers a weak ”single-snapshot”
adversary limited to only observing the flash memory
once in its lifetime.
• Adversaries can access the physical device only after it
is unmounted or powered off [5] (these are commonly
denoted as “on-event” adversaries). Thus, the running
state of the device and the DRAM contents cannot
be captured by the adversary. Indeed, otherwise in the
presence of an online adversary capable of monitoring
user I/O and device state at runtime, arguably it would be
close to impossible to provide strong plausible deniability.
Note that as is the case with all existing PD solutions,
PEARL does not protect against denial of service attacks.
Specifically, the adversary can overwrite all hidden or public
data on disk.
V. HIDING DATA USING WOM CODES
PEARL hides information by modulating the written public
data according to the data to be hidden. As we will show,
this is something that WOM codes can be re-purposed for.
The end-result of hiding information is a device state that is
indistinguishable from the case of a device that was simply
writing data multiple times using a WOM code. In this section,
we show how it is indeed possible to design such a data
encoding scheme by leveraging a special group of write-one-
memory (WOM) codes.
A. Overview
The key idea in PEARL is to store both public data and
hidden data in the same physical locations using a special
data encoding scheme that renders a sequence of bits encoding
1The raw image of a devices is not hard to acquire. For example, in many
SSDs, this can be easily achieved by opening the covers and directly reading
the memory chips with cheap off the shelf readers.
(a) A WOM code allows multiple writes to the same physical locations by
flipping some of the bits from 0 to 1. In this example, an initial write of
8 data bits results in setting 3 bits of “1” among 12 physical bits. Then,
later in a second write, a completely different set of 8 bits of data can be
written to the same locations by setting another 3 bits to 1. In the end, the
12 physical bits 010, 000, 100, 001 represent data 11, 11, 11, 11
(b) This is possible because the WOM code
in the above example allows both 011 and
100 bit configurations (codewords) to rep-
resent data 11 in the underlying device
(c) PEARL writes public data only once but chooses the codeword used
based on the bits of the data to hide. This enables it to sureptitiously hide
information even in the presence of a powerful multi-snapshot adversary.
Fig. 3. (a) Writing data multiple times using a simple WOM code. (b)
WOM codes allow multiple codewords for the same data. (c) PEARL
hides data by deciding the written codewords based on the data bits
to be hidden. The resulting final physical state (011, 100, 100, 011)
is identical to the physical bits in Figure 3(a) resulting from two
innocent writes.
public + hidden data bits indistinguishable from a sequence
of bits only encoding public data. Before detailing the data
encoding scheme used in PEARL, we provide an example to
demonstrate howWOM codes can be used to indistinguishably
encode hidden data (Figure 3).
WOM codes (details in Section V-B) are special data encod-
ing schemes that allow multiple writes to the same locations of
write-once memory by writing to some of the yet-unwritten-to
bits (from 0 to 1).
A WOM code (Table I) allows the same physical bits to
be written to multiple (e.g., two) times. In Figure 3(a) two
consecutive writes of different data (10, 00, 11, 01 followed by
11, 11, 11, 11) can go forward in the same underlying physical
locations. The end physical state is 011, 100, 100, 011. This is
possible because (Figure 3(b)) the WOM code allows data
11 to be represented by either 100 and 011 underlying bit
configuration (“codeword”). In the context of flash devices,
WOM codes are used to increase the amount of data you can
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write to a block before it is erased.
Our newly proposed data encoding scheme in PEARL writes
public data once but chooses the codeword used based on the
bits of the data to hide. This enables it to sureptitiously hide
information even in the presence of a powerful multi-snapshot
adversary.
For example, as illustrated in Figure 3(c), since the first
hidden bit is “1”, “011” is written to the underlying physical
cells for the first two public data bits “11”. On the other
hand, the second hidden bit is “0”, and in this case “100”
is written for the second two public data bits “11”, etc.
The resulting final physical state hiding bits 1, 0, 0, 1 is the
same (011, 100, 100, 011) as the physical bits in Figure 3(a)
resulting from two innocent writes. An adversary observing
this final physical state cannot tell whether it is the result
of two innocent sequential public writes as in 3(a) or of
an information hiding operation as in 3(c). In other words,
it simply cannot distinguish the two cases with any non-
negligible advantage and thus determine whether any hidden
data exists.
It is clear from the example above that WOM codes have
certain desirable properties that could provide opportunities for
a data encoding scheme hiding hidden bits in a public cover.
However, designing a general purpose data encoding scheme
based on WOM codes that enables data hiding and is secure
against a powerful adversary is not trivial. Specifically, as we
discuss later, (e.g., because of device state biases interfering
with indistinguishability and more), not all WOM codes can
be used to build suitable data encoding schemes and not all
data encoding schemes derived from WOM codes can be re-
purposed for data hiding securely. Therefore, we first need
identify what types of WOM codes can be re-purposed for
our goals and then build a data encoding scheme accordingly.
We start with an introduction of WOM codes in Section
V-B. Then we demonstrate the feature of a special group of
WOM codes – WOM codes supporting a 1st partition – that
can be used to encode hidden bits within public messages in
Section V-C. After that, we propose our strategy to convert
a WOM code to a hidden data encoding scheme in Section
V-D. Finally, we show that not all hidden data encoding
scheme based on WOM codes can ensure the deniability of the
existence of hidden data, and propose a WOM code that can
be indeed re-purposed for PD in the presence of a powerful
adversary.
B. Write-Once Memory Code
Write-once memory (WOM) was first introduced in 1982
by Rivest et al. [44] and models a storage medium consisting
of (binary) cells which can transition from a “zero” state to
a “one” state only once. WOMs are written to using WOM
codes, I/O schemes designed for this invariant. The WOM
model was then generalized [11], [10] for storage media cells
with more than two possible states. Further, “t-write WOM
codes” are WOM codes that can write additional information
into the same group of WOM cells multiple (t) times. The
number of bits that can be written on the each write does not
need to be the same.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, WOM codes
with two states only are used in the rest of the paper.
Further, for consistency, initial states of NAND flash cells are
considered to be “zero” even if in many chips, empty NAND
flash pages physically contains all bits of 1.
It is important to note that physically, NAND flash memory
features the WOM invariant. Indeed once a flash page is writ-
ten, its unwritten cells (only) can accept a second write cycle.
Several studies propose WOM codes for lifetime extension by
reduction in SSD block erasures [52], [4], [21], [22].
Data bits 1st write 2nd write
00 000 111
01 001 110
10 010 101
11 100 011
TABLE I
A WOM CODE THAT ALLOWS 2 WRITES OF 2 BITS WITHIN 3 BITS.
Table I shows a WOM code example that allows twice the
encoding of different configurations of 2 information bits using
only 3 physical storage cells/bits. As per the WOM invariant,
the 3 physical cells only change from 0 to 1 in both writes
(the initial bits are considered to be 000 before any write).
For example, if the 2 bit message that needs to be written in
the first cycle is 10, 010 will be physically written to the 3
storage cells. A subsequent 2 bit message 01 will result in a
second physical write of 110. As can be seen, this requires a
single change: the first physical cell needs to be set as 1 in
the second write (010→ 110). This elegantly enables in-place
updates. Changing 10 into 01 would not have been possible
in NAND flash without an expensive ERASE operation which
significantly reduces lifetime and increases latencies.
Note that at first glance, it may seem that all the 3 physical
cells/bits would change when the 2 bit message remains the
same (e.g. 01) for both 1st and 2nd write. This is actually not
the case. Since both 001 and 110 represent message 01 after
the 2nd write, no physical bits need to be set.
Further note that the physical bits written in the second
write are context dependent. They relate not only to the
message itself but also to the existing data in the written cells.
This mandates a read before the second write to perform the
encoding correctly. Fortunately, NAND flash reads are much
faster than ERASE operations.
C. WOM code supporting a 1st partition
Notations. “t-write WOM codes” are WOM codes that can
write additional information into the same group of WOM
cells multiple (t) times (named “1st write, 2nd write”, ... )
before requiring an ERASE. Each write requires a read of
the existing physical state context, a proper encoding of the
new logical data (“message”) using this context, and finally
a physical write of the encoded result. The logical message
encoded in the 1st write is called “1st message” and the
encoded result is called “1st WOM write codeword’, and so
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forth. For the sake of simplicity, and w.l.o.g. we consider only
2-write WOM code which has the same message space in both
writes in the rest of the paper.
Let ci ∈ C – where C = {0, 1}n and 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n – denote
theWOM write codewords of a n-bit WOM code. For example,
for the WOM code example in Table I, we have C = {c1 =
000, c2 = 001, c3 = 010, c4 = 011, c5 = 100, c6 = 101, c7 =
110, c8 = 111}.
For any two elements cx, cy ∈ C, the relationship cx D cy
is defined by the condition that cx[i] ≥ cy[i] for all i ∈ [1, n],
where c[i] is the i-th bit of c. This is related to the fact that
an unset flash bit can be easily set without requiring a page
ERASE but not vice-versa. Then, a general definition for a
2-write WOM code can be given as follows [51]:
Definition 1 (2-Write WOM Code). A (k, n) 2-write WOM
code, denoted as (k, n)-WOM2, is an encoding scheme with
message space {0, 1}k and codeword space {0, 1}n consisting
of four algorithms (E1, E2,D1,D2) that satisfy the following
properties:
1) E1: {0, 1}
k → {0, 1}n
2) E2: {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and E2(m, c) D c for
all (m, c)
3) D1: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k, and D1(E1(m)) = m for all m
4) D2: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k, and D2(E2(m, c)) = m for all
(m, c)
Informally, for the 1st write, any message is associated
with a unique WOM write codeword. The 2nd write is a bit
more tricky since the 2nd WOM write codeword to be written
depends not only on the 2nd message but also on the existing
data (1st WOM write codeword) present in that location.
Different values may end up being written i.e., E2(m, ci) may
be different from E2(m, cj) for ci 6= cj . As a result, one
message could be represented by more than one possibleWOM
write codeword after the 2nd write. For example, wrt. Table I,
the message 00 is always written as 000 in the 1st write, but
in the 2nd write it may be represented as either 000, if the 1st
written message was 00, or 111 otherwise.
E2() may have many different forms. We discovered multi-
ple WOM codes that can represent a message using multiple
WOM write codewords in the 2nd write. Our insight then
is to use this degree of freedom in the choice of the WOM
write codeword in the 2nd write to encode hidden information
sureptitiously. For example, two WOM write codeword choices
enable the encoding of one hidden bit. Generally, a choice of
2m WOM write codewords allow the encoding of m hidden
bits. A simple encoding convention would be that using the
i-th WOM write codeword choice indicates an encoded hidden
value of i.
In the rest of this paper, for simplicity, and w.l.o.g. we
consider WOM codes with two choices only, i.e., which
can encode one hidden bit through the encoding of each k
bit (public) message. These WOM codes have the following
properties: (i) each message can be mapped to 2 WOM
write codewords in the 2nd write, and (ii) each codeword is
corresponding to a few 1st WOM write codewords. We call
these WOM codes WOM Codes Supporting A 1st Partition:
Definition 2 (WOM Code Supporting A 1st Partition). Let
C1 denote the set of all 1st WOM write codewords for all
possible messages, i.e. C1 = {E1(m)}m∈{0,1}k . Consider also
a partitioning function prt(m) = (Am, Bm) which on input
m ∈ {0, 1}k, outputs two sets Am andBm, forming a partition
of C1, namely Am ∩Bm = ∅ and Am ∪Bm = C1.
Then, a (k, n)-WOM2 code (E1, E2,D1,D2) is said to
“support a 1st partition” if:
E2(m, c) =
{
wa(m), if c ∈ Am
wb(m), if c ∈ Bm
(1)
where Am and Bm are the 1st and 2nd output of prt(m),
respectively and wa(m) and wb(m) are valid WOM code-
specific functions that map input messages m ∈ {0, 1}k to
WOM write codewords in {0, 1}n.
Note that for a valid 2-write WOM code – which requires
E2(m, c) D c – we must have wa(m) D ca for any ca ∈ Am
and wb(m)D cb for any cb ∈ Bm.
Specifically, we call a WOM code supporting a 1st partition
where |Am| = |Bm| for all m ∈ {0, 1}
k, a WOM code
supporting an equal partition.
Table I illustrates a WOM code supporting a 1st partition,
but not an equal partition. Consider C1 = {c1 = 000, c2 =
001, c3 = 010, c4 = 100}. For each message m, Am =
{E1(m)}, and Bm = C1 \ Am, wa(m) and wb(m) are the
WOM write codewords in the row corresponding to message
m where wa(m) is in the second column and wb(m) is in the
third column. It can be seeen that |Am| = 1 and |Bm| = 3
for any message m. Thus, the WOM code does not support
an equal partition.
As we will see later, the ability to support an equal partition
enables the design of a plausible deniability mechanism in
which the resulting distribution of the written bits does not
leak information about the encoded hidden data.
D. Hidden data encoding scheme
Hidden data encoding. As discussed above, for a WOM
code supporting a 1st partition, encoding a “hidden” data bit
h within a k-bit “public” message p can be achieved by using
the bit to decide on the choice of WOM write codeword to
write in the 2nd write.
Then, more generally, the written data E(p, h) is a function
of both the public message p and the hidden message h.
Further as we will see, there exists a relationship between
the existing data c and the resulting encoding.
We call the encoded result the “full write codeword’ and
the write of the full write codeword is called a “full write”
to distinguish it from a 2nd write of a public-only message.
Then, the corresponding simplified encoding function is:
E(p, h, c) =
{
wa(p), if h = 0
wb(p), if h = 1
(2)
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Data bits 1st . write
2nd write
Hidden 0 Hidden 1
00 000 000 111
01 001 001 110
10 010 010 101
11 100 100 011
TABLE II
A WOM CODE THAT PROVIDES A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN WEAR
LEVELING AND PLAUSIBLY DENIABLE INFORMATION HIDING.
WITHIN A 3 CELL AREA, BETWEEN ERASES, ALLOW EITHER: (I)
two WRITES OF 2 BITS EACH, OR (II) one WRITE OF A 2 BIT
PUBLIC MESSAGE PLUS A 1 BIT HIDDEN MESSAGE.
Fig. 4. A empty page can be written to twice in two sequential
public writes p1&p2, or once with an encoding combining one public
message p and one hidden message h. The resulting state is the same
c2.
As mentioned earlier, for simplicity, and w.l.o.g. we con-
sider WOM codes with two 2nd WOM write codewords
choices only (as in equation 1), i.e., which can encode one
single hidden bit with each k bit (public) message.
Unfortunately there are no free lunches and, as will be
detailed later, the full write codeword can only be written to
empty pages with all 0s. In other words, one page cannot
be written-to twice anymore. Effectively, the hidden bit is
encoded at the cost of the ability of the WOM code to accept
additional information before the next ERASE.
Note that one of wa(p) and wb(p) are written regardless
of the existing data c. And, as discussed above, for a valid
2-write WOM code – which requires E2(m, c)D c – we must
have wa(p)D c and wb(p)D c for all possible p. This is only
possible if the existing data c is all 0s, i.e., the encoding works
only on empty physical pages, and pages can only be written
once before requiring an ERASE.
Table II adds the hidden bit encoding cases to the WOM
code in Table I. Between ERASEs, 3 flash cells can be written
to either: (i) twice with 2-bit public messages or once with a
2-bit public message and a 1-bit hidden message.
The first case corresponds to public-only operation in which
the same set of cells can be reused for a 2nd write between
ERASEs and the second case corresponds to the case of
hidden operation in which hidden messages are to be encoded
plausibly deniable.
The first case corresponds to a sequence of public writes,
e.g., an initial write and subsequent updates to the same
location. Starting with an empty page (e.g., of 3 bits for
simplicity), a public message p1 can be written into an empty
page firstly (as c1) in a 1st write (Figure 4). The encoding
used is defined by columns 1&2 in Table II. A subsequent
public message p2 can be written to the same page (as c2) in
a 2nd write. Columns 1,3 and 4 in Table II determine the final
written state, as a function of 1st WOM write codeword c1.
Note that after the 2nd write the first public message p1 will
not be available any more. Only p2 can be decoded from c2.
In the second hidden operation case, both public (p2) and
hidden (h) messages determine the encoding that gets written
(c2) in a full write. c2 is determined by columns 1,3, and 4
of Table II. Once written, both p2 and h can be decoded from
c2.
E. WOM coding & PD
0-1 Distribution Skew. While a step in the right direction,
the proposed hidden data encoding results in a bias in the
distribution of 1s and 0s in the written data when compared
to a public-only operation. This can then be used e.g., by a
multi-snapshot adversary to distinguish devices that contain
hidden information from devices that do not.
Figure 5 shows a simple example of this bias for the
example WOM code in Table II. Consider a 2 bits public
message 00. In public-only operation mode, the message is
written in a 2nd write, and the 2nd WOM write codeword will
be 000 if the 1st message residing there was 00, or 111 if
1st message there is either 01, 10, or 11. If the 1st message
written is overall uniformly distributed, the ratio between the
occurrence of 000 to 111 in the public-only operation storage
device should be 1:3.
However, in the case of a hidden operation, the full write
codeword ends up being 000 for a hidden bit of 0, or 111 for
a hidden bit of 1. Thus, for an overall uniformly distributed
hidden message, the ratio between the occurrence of 000 to
111 in the storage device will be 1:1.
Given this bias, an adversary can do statistic analysis based
on the public data on the storage data and observe a difference
between the expected and observed distribution of 0s and 1s.
A counter-argument to be made is that the public operation
mode was considering the case of two writes, and in practice
numerous pages may end up being written only once. This
may be true, however, given the existence and benefits of the
WOM encoding in the system, it is reasonable to expect that in
many cases, the device converges to a state where most cells
have been overwritten at least once. Also, while it is true one
can plausibly claim the bias was inherent in the data itself, the
security argument is weakened overall.
WOM Code Supporting an Equal Partition. Thus, the
question inevitably arises: can we do better? How can we
overcome this bias? The answer is WOM codes supporting
an equal partition.
To see why that is the case, consider that the bias comes
directly from the difference in the probability distribution of
2nd WOM write codeword and full write codeword. Reusing
the same group of WOM write codewords in the 2nd write
for the hidden data encoding ensures that the 2nd WOM write
codewords and full write codewords are indistinguishable by
inspecting the individual codes. It is an overall probability
distribution that may give the existence of hidden data away.
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Fig. 5. The WOM code in Table II features a bias in the distribution of
written 1s and 0s. The top part illustrates the resulting skew (0s:25%,
1s:75%) for public-only operations after two writes, whereas the
bottom part illustrates the hidden operation (0s:50%, 1s:50%).
Data bits 1st write
2nd write
Hidden 0 Hidden 1
0 000 00000 11110 10011
1 001 00001 11001 10110
2 010 00010 11010 10101
3 011 00100 11100 01111
4 100 01000 11111 01101
5 101 10000 11101 01110
6 110 11000 11000 10111
7 111 10100 11011 10100
TABLE III
(3, 5) WOM CODE SUPPORTING AN EQUAL PARTITION
ALLOWING, WITHIN 5 BITS: TWO SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC WRITES
OF 3 BITS, OR ONE WRITE OF 1 HIDDEN BIT AND 3 PUBLIC BITS.
Note that the probability distribution of 2nd WOM write
codeword depends on the number of elements in sets A and
B (see equations 1 and 2), while the probability distribution
of full write codeword is decided by the distribution of hidden
bit h. And, since hidden data in a PD system is highly likely
to be encrypted, h ends up uniformly distributed.
To eliminate the bias, sets A and B need to contain the
same number of elements for any arbitrary messages. In other
words, the WOM code needs to support an equal partition.
Lemma 1. The hidden data encoding scheme based on a
WOM code supporting an equal partition ensures that an
adversary cannot distinguish the 2nd WOM write codeword
that encodes public message p from the full write codeword
that encodes both public message p and hidden message h.
Table III defines a (3, 5) WOM code supporting an equal
partition. For public operation, it allows writing 3 bits of data
twice to 5 storage cells. In hidden operation, 1 hidden bit and
3 public bits can be encoded together in 5 storage cells.
One invariant for this code is that for each 2nd WOM write
codeword c2 in the “2nd write” column (sub-columns 3 and
4), there exist four 1st WOM write codewords c1 for which
c2 D c1, i.e., that can be overwritten to get to c2. In other
words, the size of the sets A or B in this WOM code is 4.
For example, considering wa = 11110 and wb = 10011 –
both of which can be used to represent public message m =
000 in a 2nd write during public operations – the correspond-
ing set A is A000 = {00100, 01000, 11000, 10100}, composed
of the 1st WOM write codewords for messages {3, 4, 6, 7}.
Similarly, set B is B000 = {00000, 00001, 00010, 10000}
composed of the 1st WOM write codewords for messages
{0, 1, 2, 5}. As a result, both 11110 and 10011 are equally
likely to appear in the written device state – for either public
and/or hidden operation modes.
Based on the WOM code in Table III, we design PEARL, a
plausibly deniable FTL that securely processes the I/O request
from the upper layers, manages the unavoidable inherent
mappings from logical to physical pages and reclaims pages
occupied by the obsolete data. More importantly, PEARL
ensures that adversaries cannot detect the existence of hidden
data by probing multiple device snapshots.
VI. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR PEARL
The hidden data encoding scheme presented in Section V
ensures that physical pages containing both public and hidden
data are indistinguishable from pages containing public data
written as 2nd WOM write codewords. However, turning it
into a workable PD solution that can protect hidden data from
the coercive adversary described in Section IV requires extra
work. Specifically, a multi-snapshot adversary can observe
not only the state of individual pages, but also state changes
across multiple snapshots. Generally speaking, over time, an
adversary can learn (1) what kind, and (2) where page state
transitions happen. A plausibly deniable FTL needs to ensure
that this information does not leak the existence of hidden
data.
This is made even more difficult by internal characteristics
of NAND flash for which page state transitions are not
independent from each other. For example, data updates are
performed via an out-place scheme rather than an in-place
scheme (updated data is written to a new location rather than
where the old data resides). As a result, pages where the up-
to-date data is written becomes valid while at the same time
the page where the outdated data resided becomes invalid.
To mitigate this, we first explore the page states and the
page state transitions in the case of deploying the WOM code.
We then introduce key requirements for a secure plausibly
deniable FTL. Finally, we provide an efficient solution. The
idea is to smartly “cloak” hidden data within plausible public
data so that the hidden data induced page state transitions can
be plausibly explained as a result of public requests.
Page States. NAND flash contains three types of pages:
empty, valid, and invalid. A “valid” page contains active data,
whereas an “invalid” page’s data is obsolete and can be erased.
In the case of a 2-write WOM code, NAND flash pages
can be categorized at a finer granularity. Firstly, based on
their current encoding, pages can be categorized as either “1st
write” or “2nd write” pages. 1st write pages contain only
public data while 2nd write pages may contain both public
data and hidden data. Note that in this case, a page storing
both public data and hidden data is still called a 2nd write
page although the page is literally written only once.
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Fig. 6. Page state transition diagram using the 2-write WOM code.
A page written twice with public data can transition through all 5
states while a page written once with public and hidden data skips
states V1 and I1. It is also possible that a page is recycled right after
it is written only once with public data (state I1 to Empty directly).
Secondly, a page can be either valid or invalid depending on
the status of the data stored inside. However, since the public
data and hidden data in the same page may have different
status we need to further distinguish things. We use “up-to-
date” and “out-of-date” to indicate data status. Then, since the
existence of hidden data should not be exposed to adversaries,
a page is denoted as valid as long as the public data there is
up-to-date, regardless of whether any hidden data coexists or
whether the hidden data is out-of-date. Note that a valid page
may contain out-of-date hidden data while an invalid page may
contain up-to-date hidden data.
Thus, in summary, a page can be in any of the 5 states:
empty, 1st write valid (V1), 1st write invalid (I1), 2nd write
valid (V2), and 2nd write invalid (I2). Each physical page
transitions between the 5 states directly or indirectly. There
may be more than one possible reason for a page to change
from one state to another. For example, an empty page may be
turned into a V2 page directly because of a full write (defined
in Section V), or it can become a V2 page indirectly by first
being a V1 page, then an I1 page and finally a V2 page. Thus,
the first requirement is shown as Requirement 1.
Requirement 1. The presence/absence of hidden data is never
the only possible reason for a page state transition. Note that
a hidden data encoding scheme based on a 2-write WOM code
is designed to intrinsically guarantee this.
Figure 6 depicts the page state transition graph for the above
5 states. Transitions are triggered by either the logical requests
from the host or the built-in functions of the NAND flash
(e.g., garbage collection). Public data can be written to either
an I1 page or an empty page, resulting in a V2 page or a V1
page, respectively Hidden data can only be written to an empty
page under a cloak of some public data. This is depicted as
a full write that transitions a page from state empty to state
V2 directly. Garbage collection brings all the pages in a target
block back to state empty by an ERASE operation. Before
erasing, the up-to-date data in those pages need to be relocated
elsewhere, while the state of the page may transition from V1
to I1 or from V2 to I2. Other operations that render data out-
of-date include logical data updates and the TRIM operation.
Figure 6 illustrates the fact that a page can transition freely
from one state to another independently of the existence
of hidden data – all page state transitions can be plausibly
explained by public data operations.
Moreover, the plausible public data that can be used as the
“cloak” is not unique and in fact has quite a bit of entropy. For
example, as Figure 4 depicts, writing hidden data h + public
data p2 ends up being the same as writing public data p1 + p2.
As the 1st WOM write codeword is completely overwritten by
the 2nd WOM write codeword, a relatively large set of public
data messages can be plausibly provided as a candidate for
p1. For a (k, n) WOM code supporting an equal partition and
pages contain n ·x bits, there are 2(k−1)·x possibilities for p1.
More specifically, as an example, consider a physical page
of 10 physical bits. In PEARL the page can contain 6 bits
of public data and 2 bits of hidden data. If the observed
physical page data 1100010101, then p2 = 110010 and
h = 01 according to Table III. An attacker obtaining a
snapshot aiming to determine the value of public data p1 can
at most know is that the first 3 bits of p1 are a value in
set {000, 100, 101, 110} (the messages corresponding to WOM
write codewords in set A110) and the last 3 bits of p1 are a
value in set {001, 011, 101, 111} (the messages corresponding
to WOM write codewords in set B010). As a result, p1 has 16
(42) possible values in total. In reality, a larger page with more
physical bits (e.g. 5×1000 bits) results into many possibilities
(e.g. 41000). For further security, this can then be used to select
the most semantically plausible values of p1, e.g., by selecting
marching terms from an English dictionary.
Page Operation Priority. The WOM code based hidden data
encoding scheme ensures multi-snapshot adversaries cannot
tell whether hidden data exists or not by observing state
transitions of any single physical page. However, by observing
aggregated state transitions of a set of pages over time, it may
still be possible for an adversary to detect the existence of
hidden data according to where page state transitions happen
(which page is written to and which page is erased).
For example, if pages containing up-to-date hidden data
have a lower ERASE priority during garbage collection com-
pared to pages containing no hidden data, an adversary could
tell whether the hidden data exists through the order in which
physical pages get erased. Thus, a second requirement can be
concluded as Requirement 2.
Requirement 2. The priorities assigned to blocks according
to which they are erased during garbage collection is not be
related to the location, state or existence of hidden data.
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 4, hidden data h in a 2nd
write page can be plausibly denied as a sequence of public
operations: p1 written to an empty page, and p2 written to an
I1 page. Solid reasons should exist to justify why p1 is not
written to any other I1 page and p2 is not written to any other
empty page etc. This derives the Requirement 3.
Requirement 3. The presence/absence of hidden data is never
the only possible reason for the presence of any public data
in a 2nd-write page.
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Fig. 7. The diagram about how PEARL allocates physical pages upon
accepting a public write request. The priorities of physical pages are:
1st invalid pages in UIQ, 1st invalid page in TIQ, empty pages.
Fulfilling this requirement 3 efficiently is related to how
writing priorities for empty pages and I1 pages are defined in
an FTL (more details in Section VII).
Note that in order to maximize writing capacity and min-
imize wear/ERASE cycles, normally I1 pages usually have
higher priority to be written to. Otherwise if empty pages are
written first, then an I1 page may be erased before the 2nd
write happens to it, which is a waste of writing capacity.
VII. PEARL DESIGN
PEARL is a FTL that satisfies all the security requirements
introduced in Section VI. It is designed based on DFTL
(Section III-B). In this section, we firstly describe in detail the
data structures used for logical-to-physical address translation
and the page allocation mechanism. Based on them, we then
introduce how PEARL deals with the public and hidden
requests from the host and reclaims the obsoleted pages with
garbage collection.
A. Address Translation
PEARL manages the logical-to-physical mapping for public
data and hidden data separately. Similar to DFTL (Section
III-B), two layer page-level maps are used. The public data is
managed by a public global translation directory (GTD) plus a
few public translation pages, while the hidden data is mapped
with a hidden GTD in addition with some hidden translation
pages. The hidden GTD is stored in the SRAM together with
the public GTD. If no power loss protection is built into the
flash device, GTDs may get lost during sudden power loss, but
can always be recovered by a full device scan. Furthermore,
storing GTD on nonvolatile storage aids recovery from power-
failure [46].
Translation pages are stored in the flash. Unlike in the case
of DFTL, both translation pages and data pages are stored in
the same group of blocks. The public translation pages are
encoded as public data, while hidden translation pages are
encoded as hidden data.
A cached mapping table (CMT) is used to cache the
recently-used mapping information for both public data and
hidden data. The corresponding public or hidden translation
page will be updated in memory whenever any mapping entry
is evicted from the CMT.
B. Page Allocation and Garbage Collection
Page Allocation. PEARL uses three variables to track candi-
date pages for writing: a Current Empty Page, a Current UI1
Page, and a TI1 page Queue (TIQ). UI1 pages are I1 pages
caused by logical data updates. Whenever the public data in
a V1 page gets updated, rather than updating in place, the
up-to-date data is written to another page and the V1 page
becomes a UI1 page. TI1 pages are I1 pages resulting from
TRIM operations that delete data. The deleted data in a TI1
page does not have corresponding up-to-date data in any other
pages of the device. We distinguish UI1 from TI1 pages since
an adversary can infer when a UI1 page becomes invalid with
only one device snapshot (detailed later and in Figure 8).
Finally, a free block list (FBL) is used to track empty blocks
in the device.
In PEARL UI1 pages have the highest priority to be written
to. As a result, since they always get written to first, there ends
up being at most one UI1 page in the device, tracked by the
Current UI1 Page record. Further, TI1 pages have a higher
priority than empty pages to be written to. Overall, public
data will be written to an empty page only if the Current UI1
Page is NULL and the TIQ is empty. Figure 7 illustrates the
page allocation rule for public data.
In contrast, it should always be the Current Empty Page that
is allocated for a hidden data write. This makes it possible for
an adversary to infer whether a 2nd write page contains hidden
data by inferring whether there exists any I1 page (either UI1
or TI1) when the 2nd write page is written to. Moreover, UI1
pages impose different threats compared to TI1 pages, which
can be illustrated with Figure 8 as follow.
For a UI1 page that becomes invalid before any hidden data
is written, an adversary would always know that it is invalid
when the 2nd write page is written to. This is straightforward
if the adversary can observe the UI1 page before writing the
2nd write page. Besides, the example of block 1 in Figure 8
explains that this is also true even if the adversary can access
the device only after the hidden data is written.
The upper half of Figure 8 lists snapshots of block 1 over
time. The adversary observe the block at time T0 and T2. All
three pages are empty at time T0. And they are in state I1, V1
and V2, respectively at time T2. The I1 page is a UI1 page as it
contains the obsoleted data p0 whose corresponding up-to-date
data p0
′ is in the V1 page. Based on the two snapshots, the
adversary can infer that: 1) the first page must be a I1 page
right after the second page is written to; 2) the third page
should be still empty at that time (since pages in one block
are written in order). Thus, the adversary can infer (although
not directly observe) that there must exist an intermediate
state where the there pages are in state I1, V1 and empty,
respectively, which is depicted as the snapshot at time T1. In
this case, hidden data becomes the only possible reason for
public data to reside in the V2 page rather than the I1 page
in time T2.
On the contrary, an adversary cannot tell whether a TI1 page
becomes invalid before or after any hidden data is written as
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Fig. 8. Without hidden data, block 1 cannot plausibly transition from
the state at time T0 to the state at time T2 because of the existence
of the UI1 page – the I1 page in block 1 is a UI1 page as its
corresponding up-to-date data p0
′ is in the V1 page. In contrast,
block 2 can plausibly transition between the states at times T0 and
T2 regardless of the existence of hidden data, because an adversary
cannot identify when a TI1 page becomes invalid – the I1 page in
block 2 is a TI1 page as it does not have corresponding up-to-date
data in the block.
long as she cannot observe the TI1 page before the hidden
write happens. This can be demonstrated with the example of
block 2 in Figure 8. Similarly, the adversary takes the snapshot
at time T0 and T2. Then she observes the state transition empty
→ I1 in the first page, and the state transition empty → V2
in the second page. The only intermediate state she can infer
is that the first page was written to be a V1 page at certain
time T1. After that, the adversary has zero knowledge about
whether the V1 page is invalidated first or the empty page
is written first. Thus, it is completely possible for the second
page to be the V2 page at time T2 without any hidden data,
as long as the second page is written before the first page
becomes invalid.
Thus, to mitigate the possible leaks caused by I1 pages,
two tweaks are used regarding the UI1 page and TI1 page:
(i) before writing any hidden data, the Current UI1 Page is
filled with public data; and (ii) all TI1 pages in the TIQ are
written to (with public data either from user requests or from
the block with the least number of valid pages) before on-
event adversaries are allowed to take a snapshot. These prevent
adversaries from detecting the hidden data by analyzing page
allocation patterns.
Garbage Collection. PEARL tags the least active block(s)
(with the least number of valid pages) as the next victim
block(s) for garbage collection. As detailed in Section VI,
the status of a page – valid/invalid – is independent of the
existence and status of hidden data stored in that page. Thus,
the selection of victim blocks does not leak any information
to the adversary regarding the presence of hidden data.
Once a victim block is selected, PEARL first checks
whether the Current UI1 Page is in the victim block. If yes,
the Current UI1 Page is set to NULL. Then all the TI1 pages
in the victim block are extracted from the TIQ. These two
actions prevent data from being written to a block that will
be erased soon. Then, up-to-date public and hidden data in
the victim block are relocated to new pages using the same
mechanism that is employed during write requests.
Specifically, the hidden data in the victim block (if any) can
be encoded and written to empty pages together with certain
public data, which comes from either the victim block or a
new public write request. As a result, the hidden data that is
stored with public data that is subsequently deleted is not lost.
Moreover, as hidden data are re-encrypted (semantically
secure, randomized) during relocation, an adversary cannot
link a particular hidden data to a public data it is stored with
before and after garbage collection. In effect, deleting public
data stored in a particular page does not impact the security
and consistency of the hidden data within.
C. I/O Operations
Common Interface for Public and Hidden Data. As
discussed in Section IV, PEARL supports both public and
hidden data requests. However, crucially, PEARL does not
require different interfaces for accessing public and hidden
data. Instead, PEARL separates hidden data requests from
public data requests by a simple offset convention. Hidden
data requests (received through the unchanged FTL interface)
address an offset beyond the physical standard device capacity.
This signals to PEARL that these requests are addressed to the
hidden volume.
Note that an adversary attempting to access hidden data
through this interface would have to provide the correct
password at boot-time. Otherwise, the system will be unable
to decrypt hidden data. As a result, simply having access to the
same interface does not provide any advantage to the adversary
in detecting the presence of hidden data.
Preprocessing. Upon receiving I/O requests from upper
layers, PEARL divides the incoming requests into page-level
requests first, which are then executed individually. To execute
these requests, the first step is a logical-to-physical address
translation. PEARL first looks up the logical page address
in the cached mapping table CMT. If no hit, either the
public or the hidden GTD is queried for the location of
the corresponding translation page which contains the target
physical page mapping entry which can be used to access the
page. The mapping is then also cached in the CMT. If this
requires a cache eviction, the least recent used entry will be
evicted, resulting an update to its corresponding translation
page on the device. And if there is any other mapping entries
which belong to the same translation page in the CMT, those
entries will be written back to the device simultaneously. It is
important to note that the (either public or hidden) translation
pages are written just like actual (public or hidden) data pages.
Public Write. In the case of a public write, after the address
translation, PEARL identifies one page for the public data
based on the page allocation algorithm in Figure 7. The public
data is written to the page following the WOM code based
encoding scheme. If the logical address was originally mapped
to a valid V1 page (the write request is an update to existing
data), the page now transitions to UI1 status and is set to be
the Current UI1 Page. If the logical address was originally
mapped to a TI1 page, the page is deleted from the TIQ and
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then set to be the Current UI1 Page. Finally, the mapping entry
is cached in the CMT accordingly.
Hidden Write. Hidden page writes require public data to
“cloak” in: first valid page in the least active public data block.
This can then be explained as a simple garbage collection
related data relocation. Similarly to the other cases, the cor-
responding public data mapping information is cached in the
CMT. The hidden and the public data are then encoded and
written to the Current Empty Page and the CMT is updated
accordingly. Finally, the Current Empty Page then becomes
the next page in the same block, or the first page of a new
empty block if the original Current Empty Page was the last
page of a block. The new empty block is selected from the
FBL.
TRIM. For either a public or a hidden page TRIM request,
the deleted data is marked as out-of-date. If the deleted public
data was in a V1 page, the page is pushed to the TIQ.
Power Loss. Power-loss recovery is not described in DFTL.
For simplicity, we assume the physical device comes with
standard enterprise grade power loss protection (PLP) backed
by capacitors that power up the device for enough time to
guarantee caches and other memory resident data structures
can be flushed to disk. PEARL adds to standard PLP the
requirement to write our hidden and public GTDs on power
loss also. We also note that if PLP is not available, all data
structures can be reconstructed by traversing the entire disk.
Encryption. Before encoding, public data and hidden data
are first encrypted with different keys using AES-CTR with
random IVs. As hidden and public data share physical pages,
they can also share the IV in the OOB area of each page.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The aim of this Section is to show that both the hidden data
content and operations are protected from a multi-snapshot on-
event adversary. The general idea is that anything that happens
between snapshots is a combination of operations. It is then
sufficient to show that each such operation does not provide
any advantage to a polynomial adversary.
Specifically, we show that any hidden operation leaves the
device in a state indistinguishable from a state resulting from
a plausible set of public operations. Then, if all operations
are sequential, the effect of any combination thereof (whether
or not they include hidden operations) can be explained by a
plausible set of public operations.
Theorem 1. A computationally-bounded adversary cannot
distinguish a physical page containing both public data and
hidden data from a page containing only public data written
as 2nd WOM write codewords.
Proof (sketch): Lemma 1 in Section V shows that by con-
struction the encoding scheme prevents an adversary from
distinguishing a page containing full write codewords (con-
taining hidden data) from a page containing 2nd WOM write
codewords.
Furthermore, hidden data is encrypted using a semantically-
secure randomized cipher. Adversaries can certainly interpret
all the pages containing 2nd WOM write codewords as hidden
data based on the encode scheme, but all she can get will be
the encrypted hidden data, indistinguishable from random.
Thus, a physical page containing both public data and
hidden data is indistinguishable from a page containing only
public data written as 2nd WOM write codewords.
Lemma 2. For any page state resulting from writing hidden
messages (either hidden data or hidden mapping table) to
an empty page, there exists at least one sequence of public
operations that results in the exact same state.
Proof (sketch): Any hidden message h is always written
together with some public message p2 (Figure 4) to an empty
page, resulting in a page state transition from empty to V2.
As shown in Section VI, this page state transition can be
plausibly explained as the combination of a sequence of page
state transitions (empty → V1 → I1 → V2). Moreover, there
exists at least one public operation that can result in each of
those page state transitions for the same physical page.
The page state transition empty → V1 can be explained by
writing some public message p1. Remember that p1 values
are not unique and can be chosen from 2(k−1)·x (Section VI)
values. The V1 → I1 transition can be plausibly explained as
updating or deleting p1. Finally, recall that p2 was relocated
from the block with the least number of valid pages. This
transition I1 → V2 can be plausibly explained as a garbage
collection relocation operation.
The mapping entry for the plausibly appearing public p1
(Figure 4) will not be updated on the device until it is evicted
from the CMT. Thus, it is highly possible that this mapping
entry change does not need to be flushed out to the device
(the mapping entry may be updated again before that), as p1
was already out-of-date when p2 was written.
In summary, the results of writing hidden messages to an
empty page can be plausibly explained by a series of public
operations.
Theorem 2. Any page state transition resulting from either
a hidden read operation or a hidden trim operation can
be plausibly explained by at least one sequence of public
operations.
Proof (sketch): As described in Section VII, for either a
hidden read or a hidden trim, the only possible state change
in the device happens when a mapping entry is evicted from
the CMT. In this cases, there are two possibilities. (1) the
evicted mapping entry is a hidden entry – in that case a hidden
translation page needs to be updated (recall it is treated as a
hidden data page) – and according to Lemma 2, the resulting
page state transition can be plausibly explained as the result of
a sequence of public operations. Or (2) the evicted mapping
entry is a public entry – in that case a public translation page
needs to be updated – and this can be plausibly explained
using public operations only.
Theorem 3. Any page state transition resulting from a hidden
write operation, can also be plausibly explained by at least
one sequence of public operations.
Proof (sketch): A hidden write operation writes the hidden
data and updates the corresponding mapping entry. The map
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update happens in the CMT and will be later flushed to the
device during a hidden translation page write when a cache
eviction happens. As proved in Lemma 2, writing either the
hidden data or the hidden translation page can be plausibly
explained with several public operations.
Theorem 4. Any page state transitions resulting from a
garbage collection operation can be plausibly explained by
at least one sequence of public data operations.
Proof (sketch): This follows by construction. First, note that
PEARL select the victim block (the block to be erased) for
garbage collection only based on the state of public data in
flash devices – the presence/absence of hidden data has no
impact on this selection. Moreover, page transitions happen
only because up-to-date data in the victim block is relocated
to new locations. All data relocations are handled in the
same way as new public/hidden data write requests – PEARL
employs the I/O operations discussed in Section VII-C to
complete these requests. Therefore, by leveraging Theorem
3, we can show that the resulting page state transitions
from the hidden write operations performed after a garbage
collection can be plausibly explained by a sequence of public
operations.
IX. PRACTICAL CONCERNS
Crypto Primitive. To ensure PD, both the public and the
hidden data encoded with the WOM code must appear to
be indistinguishable from cryptographically secure random
data. Thus, before encoding, public data and hidden data
are first encrypted (semantically secure, randomized) with
different keys in PEARL. Considering the special application
scenario of disk encryption, crypto primitives used in PEARL
implementation must be chosen carefully. For example, when
a block cipher mode requiring an initialization vector (IV)
is used, each page is usually assigned with a page-specific
random IV to enable random access. These IVs must be
easily derived from or stored in the storage system. Reusing
an IV may result into a catastrophic loss of security. There
are a few special purpose block encryption modes that are
specifically designed to securely encrypt sectors of a disk,
such as the tweakable narrow-block encryption modes (LRW,
XEX, and XTS) and the wide-block encryption modes (CMC
and EME). The application of these modes of encryption
can prevent attacks such as watermarking, malleability, and
copy-and-paste, which is critical for PD as a weak encryption
system can amplify an adversary’s advantage and enable easy
detection of hidden data.
Storage Capacity. The use of WOM codes in PEARL
amplifies the size of data because a single logical bit is now
represented by multiple bits in storage. Therefore, as expected,
the overall logical storage capacity (the total amount of logical
data that can be written) of the device reduces. We analyse
the extent of this reduction in Section X. However, critically,
it is worth noting here that logical storage capacity for public
data is not impacted by the amount of hidden data stored in
the device. In other words, an adversary cannot detect whether
hidden data is being stored with any non-negligible advantage.
Wear on Flash Device. Flash memory has a limited lifetime
– measured as the number of program/erase cycles a block
can endure before becoming damaged and unusable. Although
erasures are the major contributors to cell wear [23], recent
studies show that programming also has a substantial impact
on flash cell wear. For example, programming MLC cells as
SLC [26] or occasionally relieving cells from programming
[25] can significantly slow down cell degradation, regardless
of the number of erasures. Thus, writing a page twice with
the WOM code may increase the page wear. In other words,
the number of allowed erasures might decrease.
In PEARL, a page is written-to (programmed) once in the
case of both public data and hidden data being stored there.
The page appears to be written-to twice when an adversary
observes the device. This may allow a new type of side channel
attack where the adversary estimates page wear to determine
the presence of hidden data – the page wear may end up
being slightly decreased than what is expected when the page
contains hidden data. A detailed analysis of this physical side-
channel and its impact on overall security is the subject of
ongoing work.
Attacks on Weak Passwords. The security of all PD systems
rely on the confidentiality of the hidden encryption key, which
is usually derived from a password. There could be several
security issues related to passwords, such as online/offline
brute force attacks, social engineering, phishing etc. As a
first line of defense, PEARL requires users to choose strong
passwords with high entropy [27] thereby presumably making
the system more resilient to these attacks.
Adequate Public Cover Traffic for Hidden Data. As in
all prior works, PEARL requires public data traffic to hide
data. Hidden data is written together with public data – either
existing public data relocated during garbage collection or new
incoming public data. Garbage collection is triggered only
when empty pages are consumed by new public requests.
Thus, to enable hidden data writes, sufficient public data
traffic is required. In many scenarios this may be a reasonable
assumption since in reality the amount of hidden data requiring
protection is often less than public data.
X. EVALUATION
In this section, we firstly analyse storage and I/O overheads
in PEARL. We then present a performance evaluation with
experimental results.
Storage Overhead. The base (3,5) WOM code used (Table
III and Section V-E) in PEARL requires 5 physical bits to
store 3 bits of public logical data and 1 bit of hidden logical
data. Further, storing metadata (e.g. translation pages) requires
a few physical blocks. Overall, this reduces the total amount
of logical data that can be stored within the total capacity of
the device.
Specifically, the total amount of public data cannot exceed
60% of the total physical device capacity, while the total
amount of hidden data cannot exceed 20% of the total device
capacity. Thus, around 20% is sacrificed. This can be improved
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by using a more storage efficient WOM code that supports
equal partitions in PEARL. We leave it as future work.
I/O Overhead. Data amplification also contributes to I/O
overheads. With the (3,5) WOM code, 5 physical bits encode
only 1 hidden bit, which means that 60KB data is accessed
from the device for each 12KB of logical hidden data access.
Similarly, accessing 12 KB of logical public data requires
20KB of physical data access. This is expected to reduce
overall throughput of the system proportionally.
Moreover, as described in Section V, performing a full write
or a 2nd write requires reading of some existing public data
or the obsolete data in that page. This additional read also
contributes to I/O overhead.
Finally, PEARL also requires additional processing time for
address translation and data encoding etc., which contributes
to I/O overhead as well.
A. Experimental Results
Setup. PEARL was implemented as a core FTL engine in
FlashSim [32], a popular flash based storage system simulation
framework. FlashSim is an event-driven simulator (similar to
DiskSim[13]) and is widely used to study the performance
implications of different FTL schemes [50], [53], [18], [19].
Specifically, the evaluated PEARL uses the data encoding
scheme based on the (3,5) WOM code as discussed in Section
VII. Besides, as a baseline for comparison, DFTL is also
implemented and evaluated under the same device settings.
In the experiments below, a 64GB SSD[35] is simulated and
the parameters used for this simulation are listed in Table IV.
The page read, write and erase time are 130 us, 900 us and
10ms, respectively.
Read Write Erase (Die, Plane, Block, Page) Page size
130us 900us 10ms (1, 2, 1437, 768) 16KB
TABLE IV
PARAMETERS OF THE SIMULATED NAND FLASH DEVICE.
Logical Volume Capacity. Although the physical capacity
of the SSD simulated is 64GB, the logical capacity for the
public volume and the hidden volume are set to 36GB and
12GB respectively. The difference in capacity is due to the
use of the (3,5) WOM code, as discussed above. Comparably,
the logical volume size when DFTL is used is 54 GB.
Initialization. FlashSim starts by simulating an empty SSD.
However, it is well known that the overall performance of
an SSD degrades with increasing logical capacity utilization.
Thus, for an accurate evaluation, it is important to start with
the device at a state where it has been fairly used for storing
and accessing data for all volumes. This requires two things.
First, the SSD should be “full” – most of the physical pages
have been written at least once and contains some data (may
be invalid data). Only in this case garbage collection can be
triggered. Second, the amount of valid data in each volume
should be “equivalent” relative to volume capacity. In this case,
the write amplification due to the relocation of valid data will
be comparable.
Thus, in the initialization phase for the PEARL evaluation,
the SSD was filled with random data coming from the first
halves of the public and the hidden volumes respectively until
most of the physical pages have been written once and at least
one garbage collection has been invoked. When evaluating
DFTL, the SSD was filled with random data from the first
half of the corresponding logical volume.
Workload
Avg. Req. Read Seq Avg. Req. Inter-
Size (KB) (%) (%) arrival Time (ms)
Financial1 3.47 23.2 2.0 8.19
Financial2 2.45 82.3 2.0 11.08
Web Search1 15.51 99.9 14.0 2.98
TABLE V
ENTERPRISE-SCALE WORKLOAD CHARACTERISTICS.
Performance Metrics. FlashSim reports a total aggregated
response time for each request received. This is a combination
of the device service time and the effect of queuing delays.
Specifically, the response time not only captures the overhead
due to the internal processes in an FTL such as address
translation and data encoding, but also factors in the time
spent by the request in I/O queues etc.
While in certain cases it may be desirable to eliminate
scheduling delays etc. from the performance evaluation, this is
not possible in the current simulator and would require further
kernel instrumentation and more.
Workloads. We used both real-world workloads and synthetic
workloads to benchmark PEARL and DFTL. To evaluate
performance for real world applications, we used three popular
enterprise-scale workload traces (Table V). This includes two
different I/O traces (Financial1 and Financial2) for an OLTP
application running at a financial institution [29], and an I/O
trace from a popular search engine (Web Search1) [30]. These
traces were particularly selected since (i) their address spaces
fit within the capacity of the SSD being simulated, and (ii)
they include enough writes to invoke garbage collections.
Moreover, these traces provide different characteristics
which capture numerous real-world usage scenarios. For ex-
ample, Financial1 is write-dominant while Financial2 and
Web Search1 are read-dominant. Further, Web Search1 has
more sequential accesses compared to Financial2. Financial1
and Financial2 also have smaller request sizes while Web
Search1 requests more data per request on average. The overall
parameters for the traces are summarized in Table V.
In addition to the real-world workloads, we also used
synthetic workloads to test throughout of the system under
conditions of heavy load. As shown in Table V, the average
request interval arrival time is usually long in real-world
applications. As a result, the available device bandwidth is
never fully utilized. In order to test maximum throughput,
we ran multiple synthetic workloads where large numbers of
requests are submitted to the device at the same time (the
request interval arrival time is 0). Specifically, 100000 read or
write requests are submitted for either public or hidden data,
and each of them requests for a data chunk of 16KB. Similarly,
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Fig. 9. The average response time for three real-world traces with
different FTLs (log scale for the y axis, lower is better).
the response time is recorded for each request and we calculate
the number of request satisfied during each second (IOPS).
Results for Application Workloads. The three workloads
listed in Table V are benchmarked against different FTLs.
Figure 9 illustrates average response times for each workload.
The y axis is in log scale and the actual values are provided
on top of each column for further clarification.
Generally, I/O requests for hidden data consume more time
as compared to public data. Comparing with the baseline
(DFTL), the overhead for accessing public data ranges from
6% to 13%, while the overhead for accessing hidden data in
each workload varies between 13% to 244%. The higher over-
head for hidden data access is expected since the amplification
of data size for hidden data is 3x the amplification of public
data. Thus, a hidden data operation requires more physical
page accesses compared to a public operation requesting the
same data size.
Further, the average response time increases with increasing
percentage of writes in a particular trace. This is more obvious
in the case of hidden data accesses. Specifically, for Web
Search1, the reported average response time is comparable
to the baseline, since more than 99% of the requests are read
requests. On the contrary, the average response time when
running Financial1 trace is 2-3x higher than the baseline for
hidden data, since most of the requests are writes.
Specifically, we can conclude that hidden write requests
bring much higher overhead than public write requests. This
can be explained with the following reasons. For public
data accesses, the overhead for write operations is incurred
primarily when the data is written to a 2nd write page. In this
case, the old data in the page needs to be read first. A similar
overhead is incurred during hidden writes – the public data
that will be stored along with the hidden data needs to be read
first. However, as hidden data has a larger amplification due to
the WOM code compared to public data, the hidden data may
be spread across more pages. And each page of hidden data
requires a page of public data to be read. As a result, hidden
data writes usually require more page operations than public
data writes. In addition, a hidden write also requires updating
the map entry for the corresponding public data. This may
result in additional page accesses. Thus, overall, the overheads
Fig. 10. Throughput comparison between DFTL (baseline) and
PEARL. PEARL is slower mainly due to data amplification resulting
from the use of the WOM code.
for hidden writes are much higher than the overheads for
public writes.
Interestingly, the above results indicate that the additional
page operations are the main contributors to performance
overhead rather than additional data processing (data encoding
etc).
Results for Synthetic Workloads. The baseline (DFTL) read
throughput is around 8.5 ∗ 104 IOPS and write throughput is
around 2.5 ∗ 104 IOPS. PEARL public throughput is around
5∗104 IOPS for reads and 1.3∗104 IOPS for writes, while the
hidden throughput is 1.7 ∗ 104 IOPS for reads and 2.4 ∗ 103
IOPS for writes. In other words, PEARL throughput is around
60% of the baseline for public data, and 10% – 20% of the
baseline for the hidden data.
The performance penalty for public data operations is pri-
marily due to the data amplification resulting from the WOM
code: 5 physical bits are used to represent only 3 bits of public
data. Meanwhile, additional page reads required during the 2nd
write also reduces the write throughput of public data.
Write amplification due to WOM codes also significantly
affects the throughput for hidden data operations since 5
physical bits are required for 1 hidden bit. Besides, additional
page reads and writes are required for public data that is
written together with hidden data and plausibly explains the
changes to the device. This explains why the hidden write
throughput is around 10% instead of 20% of the baseline.
XI. CONCLUSION
PEARL is the first system that achieves strong plausible
deniability for NAND flash devices, secure against realistic
multi-snapshot adversaries.
PEARL is based on a new data encoding scheme base on
specially designed WOM codes – the first scheme that allows
hidden data to surreptitiously coexist in the same physical page
as public data. By enabling plausible explanations for all state
transitions base on public operations only, PEARL ensures
that an on-event multi-snapshot adversary cannot detect the
existence of hidden data. PEARL performance is practical
and real-world workloads perform comparably with the case
of running on a standard device without plausible deniability
assurances.
16
REFERENCES
[1] TrueCrypt. ”http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/”.
[2] Ubifs - ubi file-system, 2015. ”http://www.linux-mtd.infradead.org/doc/ubifs.html”.
[3] Ross Anderson, Roger Needham, and Adi Shamir. The steganographic
file system. In Information Hiding, pages 73–82. Springer, 1998.
[4] Amit Berman and Yitzhak Birk. Retired-page utilization in write-once
memory a coding perspective. 2013 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, pages 1062–1066, 2013.
[5] Erik-Oliver Blass, Travis Mayberry, Guevara Noubir, and Kaan Onarli-
oglu. Toward robust hidden volumes using write-only oblivious ram. In
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 203–214. ACM, 2014.
[6] Reporters Without Borders. Internet enemies, 12 March 2012.
”http://goo.gl/x6zZ1.”.
[7] Anrin Chakraborti, Chen Chen, and Radu Sion. Datalair: Efficient block
storage with plausible deniability against multi-snapshot adversaries.
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2017(3):179–197,
2017.
[8] Bing Chang, Fengwei Zhang, Bo Chen, Yingjiu Li, Wen-Tao Zhu,
Yangguang Tian, Zhan Wang, and Albert Ching. Mobiceal: Towards
secure and practical plausibly deniable encryption on mobile devices. In
2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable
Systems and Networks (DSN), pages 454–465. IEEE, 2018.
[9] Chen Chen, Anrin Chakraborti, and Radu Sion. Pd-dm: An efficient
locality-preserving block device mapper with plausible deniability. Pro-
ceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2019(1), 2019.
[10] A Fiat and A Shamir. Generalized “write-once” memories. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 30(3):470–480, 1984.
[11] Fang-Wei Fu and AJ Han Vinck. On the capacity of generalized write-
once memory with state transitions described by an arbitrary directed
acyclic graph. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 45(1):308–
313, 1999.
[12] Paolo Gasti, Giuseppe Ateniese, and Marina Blanton. Deniable cloud
storage: sharing files via public-key deniability. In Proceedings of the
9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, pages
31–42, 2010.
[13] Bruce Worthington Greg Ganger and Yale Patt.
The disksim simulation environment (v4.0), 2008.
”http://www.pdl.cmu.edu/DiskSim/index.shtml”.
[14] Laura M Grupp, Adrian M Caulfield, Joel Coburn, Steven Swanson,
Eitan Yaakobi, Paul H Siegel, and Jack K Wolf. Characterizing
flash memory: anomalies, observations, and applications. In Microar-
chitecture, 2009. MICRO-42. 42nd Annual IEEE/ACM International
Symposium on, pages 24–33. IEEE, 2009.
[15] The Guardian. Blackmail fear over lost raf data. 2008.
[16] Aayush Gupta, Youngjae Kim, and Bhuvan Urgaonkar. DFTL: a flash
translation layer employing demand-based selective caching of page-
level address mappings, volume 44. ACM, 2009.
[17] Jin Han, Meng Pan, Debin Gao, and HweeHwa Pang. A multi-user
steganographic file system on untrusted shared storage. In Proceedings
of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pages
317–326. ACM, 2010.
[18] Yang Hu, Hong Jiang, Dan Feng, Lei Tian, Hao Luo, and Shuping
Zhang. Performance impact and interplay of ssd parallelism through
advanced commands, allocation strategy and data granularity. In Pro-
ceedings of the international conference on Supercomputing, pages 96–
107, 2011.
[19] H Howie Huang, Shan Li, Alex Szalay, and Andreas Terzis. Performance
modeling and analysis of flash-based storage devices. In 2011 IEEE 27th
Symposium on Mass Storage Systems and Technologies (MSST), pages
1–11. IEEE, 2011.
[20] R. P. Weinmann J. Assange and S. Dreyfus. Rubber-
hose:cryptographically deniable transparent disk encryption system.
”http://marutukku.org”.
[21] Adam N Jacobvitz, R Calderbank, and Daniel J Sorin. Writing cosets
of a convolutional code to increase the lifetime of flash memory. In
2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing (Allerton), pages 308–318. IEEE, 2012.
[22] Ashish Jagmohan, Michele Franceschini, and Luis Lastras. Write
amplification reduction in nand flash through multi-write coding. In
2010 IEEE 26th Symposium on Mass Storage Systems and Technologies
(MSST), pages 1–6. IEEE, 2010.
[23] Jaeyong Jeong, Sangwook Shane Hahn, Sungjin Lee, and Jihong Kim.
Lifetime improvement of nand flash-based storage systems using dy-
namic program and erase scaling. In 12th USENIX Conference on File
and Storage Technologies ({FAST} 14), pages 61–74, 2014.
[24] Shijie Jia, Luning Xia, Bo Chen, and Peng Liu. Deftl: Implementing
plausibly deniable encryption in flash translation layer. In Proceedings of
the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 2217–2229. ACM, 2017.
[25] Xavier Jimenez, David Novo, and Paolo Ienne. Wear unleveling:
Improving NAND flash lifetime by balancing page endurance. In 12th
USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST 14), pages
47–59, Santa Clara, CA, February 2014. USENIX Association.
[26] Xavier Jimenez, David Novo, and Paolo Ienne. Libra: Software-
controlled cell bit-density to balance wear in nand flash. ACM Trans.
Embed. Comput. Syst., 14(2), February 2015.
[27] B. Kaliski. Pkcs 5: Password-based cryptography specification version
2.0, 2000. ”https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898”.
[28] Ramakrishna Karedla, J Spencer Love, and Bradley G Wherry. Caching
strategies to improve disk system performance. Computer, 27(3):38–46,
1994.
[29] Bruce McNutt Ken Bates. Umasstracerepository-oltp application i/o.
”http://traces.cs.umass.edu/index.php/Storage/Storage”.
[30] Bruce McNutt Ken Bates. Umasstracerepository-search engine i/o.
”http://traces.cs.umass.edu/index.php/Storage/Storage”.
[31] Gabriela Kennedy. Encryption policies: Codemakers, codebreakers and
rulemakers: Dilemmas in current encryption policies. Computer Law &
Security Review, 16(4):240–247, 2000.
[32] Youngjae Kim, Brendan Tauras, Aayush Gupta, and Bhuvan Urgaonkar.
Flashsim: A simulator for nand flash-based solid-state drives. In 2009
First International Conference on Advances in System Simulation, pages
125–131. IEEE, 2009.
[33] Kingston. Nearly half of organizations have lost sensitive or confidential
information on usb drives in just the past two years. 2011.
[34] Changman Lee, Dongho Sim, Jooyoung Hwang, and Sangyeun Cho.
F2fs: A new file system for flash storage. In 13th {USENIX} Conference
on File and Storage Technologies ({FAST} 15), pages 273–286, 2015.
[35] Chun-Yi Liu, Jagadish B. Kotra, Myoungsoo Jung, Mahmut T. Kan-
demir, and Chita R. Das. Soml read: Rethinking the read operation
granularity of 3d nand ssds. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming
Languages and Operating Systems, ASPLOS ’19, pages 955–969, New
York, NY, USA, 2019. ACM.
[36] Andrew D McDonald and Markus G Kuhn. Stegfs: A steganographic
file system for linux. In Information Hiding, pages 463–477. Springer,
1999.
[37] J. Mull. How a syrian refugee risked his life to bear witness to atrocities,
2012. ”shorturl.at/yHJL1”.
[38] BBC News. Uks families put on fraud alert. 2007.
[39] BBC News. Blackmail fear over lost raf data. 2009.
[40] HweeHwa Pang, Kian-Lee Tan, and Xuan Zhou. Stegfs: A stegano-
graphic file system. In Data Engineering, 2003. Proceedings. 19th
International Conference on, pages 657–667. IEEE, 2003.
[41] Timothy Peters, Mark Gondree, and Zachary N. J. Peterson. DEFY:
A deniable, encrypted file system for log-structured storage. In 22nd
Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS
2015, San Diego, California, USA, February 8-11, 2014, 2015.
[42] Denver Post. Password case reframes fifth amendment rights in context
of digital world. ”http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci 19669803”.
[43] The Register. Youth jailed for not handing over encryption password.
2010.
[44] Ronald L Rivest and Adi Shamir. How to reuse a “write-once memory”.
Information and control, 55(1-3):1–19, 1982.
[45] Adam Skillen and Mohammad Mannan. On implementing deniable
storage encryption for mobile devices. 2013.
17
[46] AGYKB Urgaonkar. Dftl: A flash translation layer employing demand-
based selective caching of page-level address mappings. 2008.
[47] WhisperSystems. Github: Whispersystems/whisperyaffs: Wiki, 2012.
”https://github.com/WhisperSystems/WhisperYAFFS/wiki”.
[48] Wikipedia. Key disclosure law.
”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key disclosure law”.
[49] Computer World. Nasa breach update: Stolen laptop had data on 10,000
users. 2012.
[50] Zhiyong Xu, Ruixuan Li, and Cheng-Zhong Xu. Cast: A page-level
ftl with compact address mapping and parallel data blocks. In 2012
IEEE 31st International Performance Computing and Communications
Conference (IPCCC), pages 142–151. IEEE, 2012.
[51] Eitan Yaakobi, Scott Kayser, Paul H Siegel, Alexander Vardy, and
Jack Keil Wolf. Codes for write-once memories. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, 58(9):5985–5999, 2012.
[52] Gala Yadgar, Eitan Yaakobi, and Assaf Schuster. Write once, get 50%
free: Saving SSD erase costs using WOM codes. In 13th USENIX
Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST 15), pages 257–
271, Santa Clara, CA, 2015. USENIX Association.
[53] Jian Zhou, Dezhi Han, Jun Wang, Xiaobo Zhou, and Changjun Jiang. A
correlation-aware page-level ftl to exploit semantic links in workloads.
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 30(4):723–737,
2018.
18
